Introduction
The forest rotation problem, or simply the optimal time to harvest either a single tree, or as most of the literature assumes, the time to clearcut an evenaged forest, has been without doubt the most important forest economics question of both modern and ancient times.
1 Any mention of the forest rotation problem in modern economic thinking must at least start with Martin Faustmann, a German accountant living in Darmstadt who in 1849 correctly solved the problem of the optimal time to cut a stand of trees. 2 His motivation was only to find more equitable ways to levy taxes on forest land, but one hundred and fifty years since his paper was published it remains the undisputed foundation of modern forest economics. It may in fact be the first rigorous natural resource economics problem ever solved. Indeed, at least in forest economics, the most cited pieces to this day are extensions of Faustmann's result to handle different situations and complexities.
3 Despite the importance of Faustmann's result, it is interesting (and perhaps somewhat embarrassing) that forest economists more than one century later had not come to a conclusion concerning the correct solution to the optimal forest rotation. It was Paul Samuelson who ended the 1 An evenaged forest is a monoculture ecosystem typical of planted forests throughoutthe world from boreal to tropical forests, where trees on a given land unit are planted together, grow together according to the same growth function as mortality thins the stand to a long run density, and where trees are all of equal age when harvested. Evenaged forests are "early successional" types and if left un-harvested, the forest stand will eventually break up non-uniformly as select trees die, eventually becoming an unevenaged forest. Unevenaged forests are most prevalent in the natural forests found in temperate zones. The forest rotation problem for unevenagede forests is very complex, although some progress has been made by modeling forests stands using age classes of uniform tree cohorts, and then solving for rotation ages that may or may not be specific to each cohort -age class models are beyond our scope here but we will mention some literature concerning them as needed. Finally, for definition purposes, a "stand" of trees as used in the forest economics literature refers to a uniform group in terms of species, condition, and age, and this term has been applied to both unevenaged and evenaged forest problems. A forest rotation age or length equals the time span between planting and the final harvest. 2 Faustmann's spreadsheet analysis was published in the German journal die Allgemeine Forst-und Zertung.
Pressler was the first to solve this problem using mathematics in 1850. Working without knowledge of Faustmann or Pressler, a Swede named Ohlin also solved it correctly using mathematics (Lofgren 1983) . 3 At the time of this writing and based on Googlescholar, these include Samuelson (1976) : 476 (25 th place for his publications), Faustmann's 1859 article reprinted in the Journal of Forest Economics: 346, Hartman (1976) : 478, Johansson and Lofgren (1986) , who brought another type of forest harvesting model to the literature, the life cycle problem, currently have 324 citations, and the first modeling of risk in Faustmann problems, by Reed (1984) with 206. All of these focus primarily on the forest harvesting question as is discussed in this chapter. debate in a 1976 lecture published in Economic Inquiry (Samuelson 1976 ). Samuelson revisited the myriad solutions for solving rotation age problems that existed at the time, famously showing where and why both forestersand economists (most notably Kenneth Boulding) had erred, and pointing out that Faustmann had been correct all along. The errant solutions did not correctly recognize or incorporate the idea that occupying land with growing trees imparts an additional opportunity cost (or land rent) of delaying harvest beyond the obvious financial cost of waiting to invest harvest proceeds. Samuelson's lecture was the second most important step in the development of the forest rotation problem and modern forest economic theory in general. Nearly all of the important modern extensions for solving forest harvesting problems have appeared after 1976.
Perhaps the third most important step in forest economics and rotation problems, and just as important, was Richard Hartman's extension. In the same issue that Samuelson's reflection was printed,
Hartman published another foundational piece where he took Faustmann's model as a starting point and introduced joint production of non-harvested forest goods in situ, recognizing that standing trees produce amenities that are reduced (eliminated in his model) by the act of harvesting. As long as harvesting is delayed these amenities continue to produce economic value. This basic reality serves to distinguish the economics of forests from many other fields of economics. Hartman had formalized what Samuelson guessed, namely that rotations could be longer than Faustmann's solution if solved under conditions where forests provide public goods or there are externalities (lost amenities) generated by private landowners with incentives to harvest as soon as possible. Interestingly, the reason for this is entirely linked to how the opportunity cost of delaying harvesting is affected, highlighting just how important this concept turns out to be. This chapter will survey some of the more important contributions to the forest harvesting problem in the past 30-40 years since Samuelson's and Hartman's work. We will therefore begin with Samuelson's reflection and Hartman's suggestion, moving through the literature and the various forms of forest harvesting problems that have been solved. The main parts of the chapter will focus on the largest collection of literature in forest economics since 1976, that being the forest rotation problem under risk and uncertainty -it is indeed here that the greatest variety of theories have been proposed to solve the relatively simple question of when to harvest an evenaged forest stand. We will also discuss some other extensions, focusing mainly on those that generalize the rotation problem to more dynamic problems and spatial relationships among forest tracts and forest owners, in addition to some alternative interpretations for how the harvesting decision of landowners has been examined. The reader should be advised, however, that given the popularity of this question among economists, one can barely scratch the surface of approaches to solving forest harvesting problems or their applications in one chapter. Entire books have been written where the subject features prominently (e.g., see Johannson and Lofgren 1984) . Thus, we will focus more on approaches and key results concerning the harvesting question, but we will not address many interesting and related problems, such as the large literature concerning policy design or deforestation, where harvesting models have been used to explain forest user or landowner behavior as well as land use.
As our survey will demonstrate, there is a bewildering number of versions of this basic forestry problem that have been proposed in the literature. To wit, the field of forest economics has perhaps developed slower because of the singular focus on the simple question of the optimal rotation age for so long. While this type of problem doesn't comprise 100% of the field, it is understandable that so many versions exist if one considers the diverse spectrum of underlying conditions that complicate the economics of forests, or the tasks policy makers face in both developed and developing countries where forests are important. There is a complex nature of in situ joint production of public and private goods that characterize forest stocks over space and time. Even though a tree cannot move it's location as can a a fish, the benefits from standing forests nearly always extend beyond the land unit that forest stands occupy. Since forests are one of the only long term investments that are purely "natural," there is also always a complex web of risks and uncertainties that make management decisions quite imprecise. To complicate matters further, consider that there are a wide variety of landowners who own and hold forests -often adjacently, that is, when protected ownership rights exist (they do not for a large proportion of tropical forests).
Thus, while it is not surprising that the forest harvesting problem has been studied in so many different forms, the question that comes to mind is whether there is anything interesting left to study. The answer is unequivocally yes. The basic underlying assumptions of these varied problems are nearly always the same, and as such there remain numerous challenges that lay ahead in the relatively young subfield of modern forest economics. The next logical steps in forest rotation problems can be found by abandoning some of the standard assumptions, and this chapter will end with some suggestions in this regard.
The Samuelson and Hartman revival
Samuelson's 1976 article is widely regarded as a milestone in forest rotation analysis. First, the idea that land rent is an opportunity cost of delaying harvest was formalized and contrasted with competing rotation solutions. The rotation age solution that incorporates such a cost is the one that maximizes land value if certain assumptions, such as perfect land and capital markets, hold. This land value maximizing rotation age is identical to the multiple rotations optimal age Martin Faustmann solved for in 1849.
Alternative rotation solutions, such as one that maximizes financial returns for a single rotation where the landowner harvests when the forest growth rate equals the market interest rate (known as Jevon's rule), or one where trees are harvested at the time they reach maximum productivity or size over time, were shown not to be optimal. Because these competing solutions do not incorporate the opportunity cost of occupying the land itself (called land rent), they result in a rotation age that is too long and not land value maximizing. 4 Samuelson also made clear that land rent is a market phenomenon, and if markets are perfect then all future values of using the land productively should be capitalized into current land value.
Finally, Samuelson argued that choosing a rotation age which maximizes the internal rate of return for a forest investment is not equivalent to the Faustmann rotation age, as the latter maximizes the present value of net benefits of ongoing rotations while the former may not. Samuelson also demonstrated that two other types of rotation age solutions are equivalent to the Faustmann rotation age: a single rotation problem where the land is sold at the capitalized land value after the trees are harvested, and a single rotation problem where rents to land in an alternative use are included as an opportunity cost and a certain zero economic profit condition holds for forest production.
We begin by discussing these three equivalent rotation age solutions for a landowner who establishes a forest and harvests and replants the land unit in successive rotations forever. We would be remiss for not first pointing out the somewhat heroic assumptions required for the solutions to be truly optimal and therefore maximize land value. The reader may find these assumptions alarming, but some comfort comes in the fact that later in the chapter we will address forest rotation problems where many of these restrictions are relaxed, and indeed the forest economics literature has developed through relaxing the assumptions and determining how rotation age solutions change and relate to the Faustmann solution.
First, the idea that we can solve in time zero for a forest rotation age that is equal over all identical future
rotations is an open loop problem that would not be possible without assuming the existence of a single (representative) forest landowner who never changes in terms of identity or preferences, ad infinitum.
While a government might fit this description, a large part of the world's forests in developed countries are owned and managed by private individuals (referred to as nonindustrial private forest owners, or NIPF in the forestry literature). NIPF landowners may have varying degrees of altruism concerning their forests, and therefore bequests of land and forests over time are not perfect and seamless as the basic Faustmann-Samuelson solutions require. Second, all market and biological parameters must be constant and known over time, forever. It might be less of a stretch that the forest is assumed to have the same growth possibilities in each rotation as this is often assumed in fisheries problems (i.e., the growth function does not change), but parameter constancy and perfect foresight is certainly not a valid assumption for long term natural investments like forests. The third assumption implicit in the basic Faustmann problem is that land and capital markets are perfect, i.e., land value capitalizes all future productive returns that can be captured, and a landowner faces the same market interest rate as everyone else and can borrow or lend freely (i.e., there are no financial constraints that may affect the timing of the harvesting decision). This is definitely a stretch. For example, there may be real estate pressures from increasing urbanization that change the land market over time, and these would cause not only changes in land prices but also changes in the pattern of land rents. There may be information externalities that render perfect land markets implausible. We know landowners can face financial constraints and difficulty borrowing given a large set of literature centered on forest management decisions when landowners are capital or credit constrained -this has been found to affect the optimal harvesting choice in many types of harvesting decision models (e.g., see Koskela 1989) . Further, and just as important, landowner preferences may change over time, or even depend on what adjacent landowners prefer or do with their forests, as Swallow and Wear (1993) first formalized.
In some cases, and completely in violation of the basic open loop problem, forest landowners may even behave sub-optimally by choice (but still rationally from their point of view). For example, when deciding when to harvest or how to manage their forests, they may be cost minimizers (e.g., see
Brazee and Amacher 2000), or they may be income satisfices and harvest when income is needed or debts must be repaid (Fina et al. 2001) . Finally, another assumption that goes without saying is that the basic Faustmann problem applies to evenaged forest types planted in ongoing rotations on a single land unit (such as a hectare). This does not mean that the Faustmann rotation problem ignores dynamics of growth such as how forest volume is effected by spacing and mortality of tree cohorts over time, but rather these dynamics are such that all standing trees are always of equal age at each instant. Many productive plantation forests are evenaged forests, although temperate forests are typically unevenaged, so that at any point in time trees on a given land unit may be of unequal ages. This complicates not only the modeling of forest growth but also the rotation age decision and optimal solution, because in a sense one must decide when to harvest each tree or age class of trees. The growth function of an unevenaged stand is very complex, and this makes the rotation age solution equally as complex and prone to cycles and other types of dynamic solution issues (see Heaps and Neher 1979 , Lyon and Sedjo 1983 , Mitra and Wan 1985 , Salo and Tahvonen 2003 .
With these caveats in mind, and assuming all of the above conditions hold, we begin by writing a net present value function ( ) of land owned in perpetuity, and where planting and harvesting of forests occur repeatedly after a cost, , is spent to begin the first rotation at time zero.
where is the timber harvesting price, r is the market interest rate, and ( ) is the forest production (i.e., volume or some measure of size that is priced in a market) at time T for the land unit in question. The volume function ( ) exhibits an S-shaped curve where trees on the land unit grow in phases: a seedling stage where trees are not merchantable, a pulpwood stage where trees are relatively small but growing very rapidy in a convex fashion (7-10 inch diameter), and a sawtimber stage where trees are larger and their growth begins to slow in a concave fashion (> 10 inches diameter).
The net present value function in (1) is referred to as many things, and its reference is not standard in the literature -these include land expectation value, bare land value, and soil expectation value, all of which reflect the fact that it is essentially the value of land written in a way that capitalizes rents from all future forest rotations harvested at an optimal rotation age equal to T, and the fact that the landowner begins with bare land before incurring the cost to start the forest investment.
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( ) is derived quite simply, by considering that at time zero a forest is started by expending c, and then the first harvest occurs at time T and yields the landowner revenue of ( ). Since the assumption is that the forest is immediately re-planted upon harvesting at the same cost (forever), the first n rotations produce a return 5 It is trivial to write land value for a forest stand that has standing trees at a point in time t. The land value would simply be ( ) plus the current harvesting value of the trees at time t. The rotation age solution for this forest would be identical to the one solved in (2), but there may be an issue concerning when the current forest is harvested and the new one is started. Also, in (1), P is known among foresters as a "stumpage price." It is a net price that includes the cost of harvesting paid by the non-landowner harvester. Often the net price is a step function as trees grow through different product classes (pulpwood, sawtimber) as they age, and in other cases the real price of timber is assumed to increase over time in a known way. These types of problems can be handled with a more notationally complex version of (1), but as long as the same growth function exists in each rotation they are not difficult modifications. Finally, (1) is written in continuous time but certainly it sometimes makes sense, for example in problems of risk or uncertainty, to write it in discrete time. Finally, there can be cases where a landowner "merchandises" a stand by selling part of each tree (the lower log) at its "sawtimber" price and the tops or smaller logs of the tree at "pulpwood" prices. This is not an issue and again can be dealt with using more complex notation in (1) as long as the assumptions for the problem continue to hold.
of: ( ) ( ) ( ) In perpetuity as , we can factor the single rotation present value return ( ) and reduce the remaining discount factor sum using a geometric series simplification. Doing so gives equation (1).
The first order necessary condition for the optimal rotation age T is, after some rearranging,
The first term is the marginal benefit of waiting to harvest in terms of additional growth in harvest value over one instant, while the second and third terms are the marginal cost of delaying harvesting. The first of these is the lost investment income by not harvesting one instant sooner and investing the revenue at market rate r, while the last term is the opportunity cost of delaying the rotation in terms of occupying the land (which has value ( ) from (1)) for one more instant. This last term is the land rent and represents the term that was ignored in many early derivations of the forest rotation solution.
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A rotation solution that maximizes only financial returns for a single rotation, ( ) , includes only the opportunity cost of lost investment but not the land rent. The first order condition for this single rotation problem produces a simple and dangerously intuitive harvesting rule under the assumed constant prices equal to:
= . This implies it is optimal to harvest when the marginal growth in volume (i.e., the return from the investment 'on the stump') is equal to the market interest rate (i.e., the return from harvesting and investing in financial instruments). This single 6 The pre-multiplying nonzero term /(1-)] has been deleted from the first order condition prior to arriving at equation (2). This will be the case as well in (4) and a cross partial derivative in E and T exists that depends on assumptions about forest species type and response to management actions. The optimal rotation age now involves solving two necessary conditions, for E and T. The same caveats and assumptions apply in this problem as in (1), but depending on the forest growth function the rotation age could be longer or smaller than in (1) (see Chang 1983) . 7 A timber supply interpretation has been proposed for the rotation age solution in (2). This involves annualizing forest volume removed by harvesting at the optimal rotation age, ( ) , where the optimal rotation age is a function of the exogenous price and cost parameters, = ( ). This supply function can be backward bending in price because new land entering into forests as prices rise is not factored into the model. For a discussion of this issue see rotation optimal solution is known as Jevon's rule. 8 It is equal to the Faustmann rotation age only if land rent is zero. Another alternative harvest rule is to harvest trees in a way that maximizes mean annual increment of forest growth over time, ( ) . This problem ignores both opportunity costs of delaying harvesting present in (2) and as such is a non-economic interpretation of the problem -it equals the Faustmann rotation age only under zero discount rate and zero regeneration costs. This is sometimes referred to as the maximum sustained yield harvesting rule although this is a slightly different reference than in fisheries problems.
There are two equivalent simple formulations that give the same result for the optimal rotation age as in (2). The first is a single rotation solution where the land is sold immediately after harvesting in a competitive and perfect land market. This land sale will therefore equal ( ) in (1), and the problem collapses into that of Faustmann. Letting ( ) equal the land sale, we have ( ) = ( ) ( ) , where the first two terms represent the first rotation. Now, simply defining ( ) = ( ) we arrive at (1). A second equivalent formulation is one where we again have a single rotation but now we subtract the rents to using the land in the next best alternative land use (for example, agriculture).
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Letting ̅ be the return in the alternative land use at each instant of time s, we have the following objective function, ( ) = ( ) ∫ ̅ , and evaluating, the integral term becomes:
, or in other words there is a zero economic profit condition imposed on ( ), then the resulting first order condition yields the Faustmann rotation age.
The basic forest rotation problem has been extended in several directions. The Faustmann optimal rotation age has been found to be a steady state result in more general dynamic problems (Anderson 1976, Tahvonen and Salo 1999) . Faustmann land value has been used to explain land use choices where forest plantation rents (a backstop technology for primary native forests) are described by a version of (1), and 8 To see how Jevon's rule differs from Faustmann, notice that the first order condition in (2) can be expressed
so that the two differ in that single rotation problem omits land rent. 9 Implicitly we have assumed forests are the best use of the land in writing (1) in the first place although this is just a foregone assumption. then margins between forest and alternative uses are defined through comparing (1) to rents from competing land uses (Hardie and Parks 1997) , although most of these models have been static in nature (an exception is Hartwick et al. 2001) . Related work has integrated Faustmann's problem into more general common property problems to study local control of resources and tenure arrangements in tropical countries (Barbier and Burgess 1997 , Parks et al. 1998 , Amacher et al. 2008 . The Faustmann rotation solution can also emerge in more general forest age class forest models that consider a forest of many (even-aged) age classes with each age class occupying a distinct land unit (Salo and Tahvonen 2003) . In these problems, cyclical Faustmann harvest steady states are possible and may dominate other "normal" forest long run structures. The Faustmann rotation age in some cases can even be relevant to uneven-aged forest or multiple crop models (Wan 1994 , Chang 1998 , Haight 1987 . One prolific area of research has been to investigate the optimality of the Faustmann rotation age when there is risk of natural/catastrophic events or future timber prices (Reed 1984 , Brazee and Mendelsohn 1988 , Plantinga 1998 , Gong 1998 and additionally risk averse landowners (Alvarez and Koskela 2007 , Lien et al. 2007 , Zhang 2001 , Clarke and Reed 1989 . There are in fact also Faustmann-like solutions in stochastic harvest stopping problems where prices or forest stocks evolve over time according to known drift and volatility (F. Chang 2005 , Sodal 2002 , Willassen 1998 . Because (1) is simply a rent maximization problem, the dual cost minimization counterpart has also been solved, although some conditions concerning constraints in the cost function are necessary (Brazee and Amacher 2000) . There are also reasons that Faustmann's rotation problem can be relevant in more general life cycle consumption problems (Tahvonen and Salo 1999) . This is somewhat unexpected, as these models are utility based maximization problems where a landowner owns forests that can generate income when harvested. In these problems, if harvesting income and preferences are separable in the Fisherian sense, as shown later, then the Faustmann rotation age emerges as optimal (separation likely doesn't hold when forests produce other non-harvesting goods that are important to utility, as we show below in the Hartman extension). Interestingly, though, in two period interpretations of the life cycle problem, the harvesting solution is more in line with Jevon's rule.
The Faustmann problem has also found wide application in various policy discussions such as forest and land taxation.
Finally, although it is not at first apparent, Faustmann's problem serves as a link to other subfields of natural resource economics. More importantly, the problem of deforestation of primary tropical forests, now a serious world problem in developing countries, is essentially an exhaustible resource mining problem where many of the issues raised in exhaustible resources apply. In these models, mining type path results governing depletion over time are modified for in situ forest public goods (see Amacher et al. 2009, chapter 12) . Although it may seem to the reader that depletion of primary native forests in tropical countries does not appear terribly relevant to Faustmann or even forest rotation models, causing some to undoubtedly believe that Faustmann is a specialized forestry-only concept, the fact is that (1) is needed to formalize rents from establishing plantations for wood production in any case. Forest plantations are certainly an imperfect substitute backstop technology for harvesting of primary tropical forests. The degree of substitution depends on the public and private goods of interest, but clearly the depletion of tropical forests and deforestation in general depends on the relation of this backstop to the mining problem. Recent contributions that consider these links can be found in Wirl (1999) and Hartwick et al. (2001) .
When discussing in situ public goods from forests and the rotation problem, we must start with Hartman (1976) , who considered the first example of an externality in forest rotation models, showing under certain conditions that the optimal rotation age could be longer than predicted in Faustmann models. In some cases, the rotation age could even be close to the maximum mean annual increment harvesting time. The key feature of Hartman's rotation interpretation is an assumption that in situ standing forest has value not related to harvesting. These "amenities" as they are frequently called in the literature are goods such as recreation, habitat, carbon storage, species diversity, and scenic beauty. They can be thought of as either private goods if only the forest landowner captures their value, or public goods if they matter outside of the landowner's preferences (carbon storage or species diversity benefits are examples). 10 The way that amenities are assumed to change over time determines the nature of the optimal rotation solution.
Assuming all other conditions for the Faustmann solution hold, define ( ) as the value of amenities at some time t between forest planting and forest harvesting. This function is called many things in the literature, including a non-timber benefit function, amenity valuation, a amenity production function, in situ preferences, and the public good value function. If it is assumed that older forest stands produce higher amenity values, as would be the case with certain wildlife species or with carbon storage, then amenities are usually assumed strictly concave in time (i.e., in forest stand age), ( ) and ( ) . However, it is possible that younger stands have higher values, such as would be the case for certain bird species, and now ( ) could be convex and declining in forest age. In fact, the amenity function could have both concave and convex parts depending on the feature valued by a landowner or the importance of public goods to social welfare. One then has to worry about whether the forest rotation maximization problem has proper second order and concavity properties, as Strang (1983) points out.
We will take the standard case considered by Hartman where older stands provide higher amenities so that they are strictly concave. The optimal rotation problem is to choose T to maximize:
In (3) there is a now a felicity function describing the accumulation in the stock of amenities from planting to the end of the rotation, for each rotation ad infinitum. An additional assumption required to write (3) in the same way we showed (1) is written is that the time pattern of the amenity function is identical in all future rotations. Amenities are an additional rent captured by the forest landowner, but since it is a rent that is increasing in stand age (by assumption here) and therefore in delaying harvest, it increases the marginal benefit of delaying in the current rotation; however, the land rent cost is increased because now there are additional benefits foregone from not starting a new rotation earlier. These two effects are shown in the first order necessary condition that is a counterpart to (2),
The first two terms are the marginal benefit of continuing the rotation (this is increased by the additional amenity benefit from delay), the third term is the lost financial return from postponing harvest as in (2), and then the last term in brackets is land rent modified for amenities. The first part is equivalent to (2), but now there is an additional cost of delaying harvest in terms of the present value of all future amenities in later rotations. Obviously, whether (4) leads to a longer rotation age than (2) depends on the nature of A(s). Comparing (2) and (4), the additional term ( )
determines this result. Koskela and Ollikainen (2001) explore this difference for various amenity valuation cases, finding that an increasing amenity function with stand age implies a longer rotation age, while a decreasing amenity function with stand age implies the landowner will harvest sooner than the Faustmann solution.
Hartman's basic result has been extended in as many if not more articles than has the Faustmann interpretation of the forest rotation. Snyder and Bhattacharyya (1999) propose an optimal control version of (3) and examine transversality conditions such that an infinite rotation age is optimal, i.e., the trees are never harvested; this is likely if the path of amenity benefits is high enough as the stand ages, and by definition only includes the case in Koskela and Ollikainen (2001) of increasing amenity benefits with stand age. Tahvonen and Salo (1999) find a Hartman like result can hold in dynamic life cycle models as a steady state when in situ preferences (as they refer to amenities) exist -here Fisherian separation between preferences and forest harvesting cannot be assumed because of the marginal utility of amenities.
In these types of problems, there are often inter-generational externalities over time aside from those related to amenities in each rotation, because the bequest intentions of forest landowners affect their harvesting decisions and land sale decisions (Tahvonen 1998 . A Hartman rotation age analog has also been found in models that examine natural risks (Englin et al 2000 , Amacher et al. 2005 , where natural events such as wind and ice storms or fires change the flow of amenities over time.
Amenities to a lesser extent have been introduced in problems with stochastic market parameters, and a few articles consider stochastic amenities themselves (Gong et al. 2005 , Reed, 1993 , Conrad 1997 , Alvarez and Koskela 2007 . And of course, because amenities can be defined as public goods, and a landowner would not be expected to have identical preferences to a social decision maker, Hartman type rotation models have been instrumental in defining the nature of externalities and social costs involving forests, with a wide range of applications including deforestation, forest taxation and subsidy design, biodiversity, and carbon storage.
A particularly relevant extension of Hartman's problem that will continue to be important is the relatively recent modification to accommodate amenity functions across forest parcels (or multiple stands) that are linked both spatially and temporally. Hartman's problem in (3) applies only to a single stand and only in a case where temporal changes in the amenity function are assumed to occur. The idea in spatially explicit rotation models is that the amenity valuation function for one parcel could depend on forest structure and more importantly forest landowner behavior on adjacent parcels. The relationship of amenities across parcels is potentially very complex, as they can be spatial complements or substitutes over space, but this spatial relationship could and probably does change as the adjacent stands age.
Four key studies that have examined this problem are Swallow and Wear (1993) , Swallow et al. (1997) , Koskela and Ollikainen (2001) , and Amacher et al. (2004) , while one of the earliest is Bowes and Krutilla (1989) . Swallow and Wear (1993) propose a dynamic programming problem to determine the harvesting flow from a focal stand (as the stand in question is called) where the state of amenities on the focal stand depends on links with adjacent stands, but all stands are assumed to be owned by the same landowner and only simulation results are obtained for rotation lengths. Koskela and Ollikainen (2001) solve a closed form rotation solution using a version of (3) and introduce the idea of spatial complementarity and
substitutability to an open loop problem. In these studies, there is either one forest owner (such as a government), or the adjacent stand is assumed exogenous to the focal stand. Amacher et al. (2004) however consider adjacent parcels owned by different landowners, so now the timing of landowner decisions (i.e., whether they are simultaneous or first mover based) matters to the optimal rotation age solution of the focal stand. Generally, strategic behavior revealed through either a Nash equilibrium or the Stackelberg solution results in shorter rotation ages and socially costly free riding compared to the sole owner outcome if stands are spatial complements in amenities, because one landowner can obtain amenities from another's property and thus harvest sooner. But Nash rotation ages are longer if adjacent stands are spatial substitutes. The size of the differences depends on temporal relationships.
These models specify an amenity function in (3) of the form,
where is the rotation age of the adjacent stand (assumed exogenously given in all of these articles but Amacher et al. 2004) , is the rotation age of the focal stand, and s is focal stand age. Spatial interdependence between focal and adjacent stands is defined through the derivative, ̃ ( ); a positive derivative indicates spatial complements while a negative derivative indicates spatial substitutes. Regardless of what is assumed for the spatial and temporal links, these definitions make it possible to solve an open loop Hartman-like rotation problem that accommodates multiple stands.
Several extensions of the basic spatially explicit forest rotation model have appeared since the early articles. Most of these problems are studies of strategic behavior and free riding that center around risk mitigation across forest properties (Crowley et al. 2007 ). Free riding is easy to envision, as forest management actions on one stand could benefit an adjacent landowner, who could in turn increase harvesting revenue while foregoing production of own amenities as long as adjacent stands are spatial complements. This is especially important to the incentives landowners have to engage in costly fuel reduction for fire protection, incentives to control invasive species, and even to deforestation in developing countries (Busby et al. 2013 , Albers 1996 . Still, and despite the promise of this growing area of research, the lack of empirical studies concerning the amenity valuation makes it difficult to come up with a general theory of how forest rotations depend on adjacent stand interdependencies.
Alternative approaches to forest harvesting problems
The open loop almost static nature of most forest rotation models provides a simple framework for analyzing a variety of forestry problems, but in many ways it is specific to forests (and wine aging, interestingly) and this has made the study of forest economics develop in a somewhat distinct way from other renewable resource problems. Given the restrictive conditions under which the problems above require, it is not surprising that many alternative models for forest harvesting exist, and an equally long review of these models could be written. Many of these alternative approaches were motived by the fact that a large percentage of the world's forests in developed countries are owned by nonindustrial private landowners with diverse preferences. In these cases, it is possible that the preferences of landowners and the production of amenities or timber revenue from their forests are not separable, in the sense that preferences can have an impact on forest harvesting. If non-separability holds, then choosing a harvesting strategy to maximize land value in (1) or (3) may not be optimal. Instead, a NIPF landowner will decide to harvest according to a utility maximization problem, where timber harvests provide income used to finance consumption and standing timber provides positive utility if amenities are valued. The utility maximization approach to forest harvesting is a powerful way to study how landowner preferences or financial constraints (such as credit rationing) impact timber supply. Another motivation for these approaches, particularly the more dynamic ones, is to provide some link between the theory of forest economics and other renewable resource capital theories.
Life cycle problems, as this class of models is typically labeled in the literature, are particularly interesting because they tend to combine the dynamic nature of forests over multiple generations of landowners, like Faustmann's problem, with the utility theoretic feature of two period consumption/savings models. 12 The general problem is set up so that a landowner chooses a harvesting strategy over time (or in two period versions, in the present period when the landowner supplies labor and future periods when retired) such that utility is maximized subject to some equation of motion governing the forest stock, and an asset-consumption equation of motion. Often, the additive and time separable dynamic utility function is assumed to depend on both consumption financed by timber harvest income, and amenities the landowner enjoys from standing forest -here, amenities have the advantage in that they can be defined as a function of time or of the forest stock, which has some advantages and can more A natural modification of the life cycle problem is to assume that there are multiple and different generations of landowners holding forests and who overlap through time. To see this, define a new utility function of consumption for a landowner in each period of life, so that and equal consumption in the first and second periods of life for a landowner born at time t; it is usually also assumed that the 13 Tahvonen and Salo were pioneers in these types of problems. In many articles, including Tahvonen et al. (2001) , an additional asset equation of motion is present and equals: ̇( ) = ( ) ( ) ( )), where ( ) is the value of liquid financial assets held at time . Asset levels are a state variable in their optimal control problem, and the landowner chooses the path of consumption and harvesting over time to maximize utility that is a function of income. 14 There are other ways to incorporate a land value and periodic rotation age ( ) from (1) in a dynamic control problem to allow for periodic harvesting with a continuous control, such as consumption. Snyder and Bhattacharyya (1990) use an objective functional which, modified to fit the above discussion, involves choosing a path of consumption and a rotation age according to:
where ( ) is the value of harvesting at rotation age T. 15 Failure of separability implies that income and substitution effects factor into rotation age and in many cases nonconstant rotation ages could be optimal.
landowner supplies labor in period 1 and retires in period 2. The utility function for this problem is: ( ) ( ) where is the maximum (indirect) utility of the next generation who is young when the previous generation's landowner is old. Successive substitution yields an infinite path of consumption utilities that can be used in the life cycle framework with appropriate consumption and saving constraints for each generation. The parameter is a measure of how altruistic the current generation is to future generations. Given that this type of problem makes age distinctions part of the consumption constraint and of utility, we can use it to consider how forest harvesting depends on the decision to give bequests of forests or money to the next generation (as a cost to second period consumption), as well as inheritance of forests from previous generations (a benefit to first period consumption). This revision to the life cycle utility function so that there are overlapping generations of landowners is important to make explicit the value that a current generation attaches to forests bequeathed to future generations. Doing so allows examination of a different type of amenity benefit, that is, benefits from future preservation of forests given to the next generation. These models yield similar forest harvesting conditions as life cycle problems but have been used extensively to examine policy instruments related to the incentive to bequest or sustain forest stocks over time and in various long run steady states (Lofgren 1991 , Amacher et al. 2002 . 16 An interesting linkage between the life cycle type of problem and other renewable resources problems was first developed by Anderson (1976) and extended in a more complete form by Tahvonen 
Risk and forest harvesting
Risk has been an important but relatively new topic in forest economics since the mid-1980s, and it remains the most common extension of the basic forest harvesting problem in the literature. There has been considerable progress, but one goal has been universal in all of this work: to focus on solving the forest rotation problem assuming that landowners do not have perfect foresight concerning future parameters, a key Faustmann assumption, and then comparing the resulting rotation that maximizes expected land value to the Faustmann rotation age. This has led to three distinct paths in the literature.
The first path is one where the effects of natural disasters that destroy trees before rents can be captured through harvesting are examined. A key feature of these models is that natural risk makes landowners worse off when the event arrives. Natural risk is often studied in open loop rotation models by assuming the arrival of the event in any one year is independent of arrival in another year. The second path has been to consider risk in future market parameters that are unknown at the time a forest is started. Since these parameters can evolve or even fluctuate over time, and because market equilibrium places some bounds on the range, it is sometimes true that market risk makes landowners better off than they might expect when investing in the forest. To a lesser extent, the third path has focused on rotation problems where the two types of risks are combined, although these problems are not common due to their obvious tractability difficulties. For the first path, a Poisson arrival process is usually used to describe the probability of an event during a rotation. For the second and third paths, the assumptions researchers have used to describe the stochastic processes are quite varied, which is not surprising given that there is conflicting empirical evidence on how some parameters, namely timber prices, change over time. There is also variation in how forest stand volume and value are treated, with many stochastic rotation models combining price and volume risk into a 'stand value risk'.
These paths have led to a separation of results in forest harvesting problems under risk. Natural risks cause discrete downward jumps in forest returns, and so the optimal rotation is usually shorter that the Faustmann solution for a risk neutral decision maker -this is because the expected opportunity cost of continuing any rotation and not harvesting increases in all periods. However, if the landowner can employ costly protection effort during a rotation that somehow modifies stand structure in a way that minimizes damages from natural events, then longer rotations are possible if this effort results in lower forest (and harvest rent) damage should an event arrive before rotation age. Examples of protection are thinning to reduce resultant ice damage from a future storm, or removing fuels on the forest floor that reduce fire damage to standing trees. The key assumption in these modifications in most of the literature is that the probability of an event is not affected by protection effort, but rather the salvageable timber after an event changes.
Market risk, especially price risk, is different. Because a high volatility or variance in price distributions can increase the probability of observing a future high price that increases rents at harvest time, risk neutral landowners could be better off delaying a rotation and waiting to harvest at the instant a high price is observed; in some cases this can lengthen the expected rotation beyond what Faustmann predicts. Reed (1984) was first to show that optimal rotation ages could be shorter with the possibility of natural disasters (fire in his paper), while Brazee and Mendelsohn (1988) were the first to examine market risk and showed in a simulation that longer (than Faustmann) rotation ages could not be ruled out under conditions of mean preserving spreads in the distribution of future prices. In the extensions that have followed these two articles, the same basic results have held, even if market parameters are assumed to evolve over time as a general stochastic process (e.g., Chang 2005 , Insley 2002 , Willassen 1998 or where it is assumed that risks extend beyond a single stand to either multiple age classes of the same species or collections of different species (Haight 1987 , Tahvonen 2004 . While this indicates the robustness of the basic results, it arguably also means we have made less progress in studying risk than perhaps should have been made in nearly 30 years.
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There are other similarities in the large literature on risk and rotation age decisions. The decision maker is typically assumed to be risk neutral, and choices have included rotation age, planting intensity, stand thinning or fuel reduction, and land use under the various risks discussed above. However, only a few exceptions consider risk aversion for the landowner making rotation age choices (e.g., Alvarez and Koskela 2007 , Lien et al. 2007 , Clarke and Reed 1989 . Further, the basic Markov assumption that parameter probabilities are uncorrelated through time is universal in theoretical analyses. Risks are also nearly always treated singly, although some exceptions exist combining natural and market risk or more than two natural events (Thorsen and Helles 1998) . When more than one market parameter is assumed stochastic, it has also been assumed that the parameters follow separate processes.
Parameters of interest in this sub-set of articles are price, interest rates, amenity value functions, and forest stand value and volume.
17 The forest economics literature has not always been consistent when referring to the terms 'risk' and 'uncertainty'. Risk applies in problems where the precise realization of a future parameter at a given future time is unknown, but we know the distribution that the parameter is realized from once that time is reached. For example, in Brazee and Mendelsohn (1988) , future harvest prices appear each instant in time as a random draw from a normal distribution, while in Reed (1984) , the arrival time of fire is unknown but the arrival rate is explained by a Poisson distribution. In both of these articles, the space defining states of nature in future periods is known but the precise state of nature that will exist at harvest time or before at any instant is unknown. Thus, forest harvesting models have assumed something about landowner risk preferences and focused on how the harvesting decision is sensitive to parameters of the probability distributions of random variables. The case of Knightian, or pure uncertainty, has not yet been considered in forest rotation models but will be discussed later in this chapter.
In models where parameters are assumed to evolve over time according to some drift and volatility, the types of stochastic processes used have been most commonly simple and geometric Brownian motion (similar to random walks) and mean reversion (similar to autoregressive persistence and structure). Forest stand value has been modeled using Brownian motion or geometric Brownian motion.
Prices have been assumed to follow either geometric or simple Brownian motion or mean reversion.
Mean reversion has been used for prices or interest rates and is relevant when market equilibrium implies that perturbations in prices eventually converge to a long term mean. Finally, amenity functions have been assumed stochastic and to follow a drift and volatility, but these have also been assumed to follow very simple stochastic processes such as simple Brownian motion over time that likely do not reflect the realities of amenity functions discussed earlier. Another problem with much of the stochastic rotation literature is a tendency to lump forest growth or stock risk and price risk into a single parameter defined as stochastic "stand value". This then is assumed to evolve over time as the biological features of the site and timber prices evolve, and geometric Brownian Motion is usually assumed for the underlying process.
The focus of this section will be forest landowner rotation age decisions under risk neutrality. It is beyond the length of this chapter to detail the precise procedures behind solving all of these problems and especially stochastic rotation variants as those require use of Ito calculus. For these details the reader is referred to , chapters 10-12. Instead, we will survey the more important efforts aimed at solving forest rotation problems, with a focus on how the problems are set up and then what the main results are and how they differ across the paths of research noted above. We will also propose some extensions to rotation problems under more realistic correlated risks and the case of pure uncertainty.
Natural and catastrophic events
The earliest work addressing catastrophic events such as fire, disease, and storms during a rotation are due to Martell (1980) , Routledge (1980 ), Lohmander (1987 , and Anderson et al. (1987) . One of the most cited articles in forest economics is Reed (1984) , who incorporated arrival of stand damaging fire using a Assuming all Faustmann market and stand growth parameters remain constant ad infinitum, we begin by defining the arrival probabilities of a catastrophic even using a Poisson process like Reed did, so that events arrive independently through time. Define a random variable event , or the time between successive arrivals of events, such that the probability that an event arrives before rotation age T is ( ) = , while the probability that no event occurs up to harvest time is ( = ) =
, where is the Poisson parameter and equals the rate at which the event could arrive in any year.
The arrival of the event here is constant and not dependent on the age of the stand.
All studies in this subset of models must then describe how forest rents are affected by the event's arrival. For this example, assume that destruction of the stand is total either by the arrival of the event or by harvesting, so that the current value (rent) of the stand in rotation n, depends on whether the event arrives before the rotation age or not. The rent for the nth rotation is,
where c is the cost of starting a stand at time zero or after harvesting, and of restarting a stand at any time during a future rotation if an event arrives before harvesting. In (5), the rotation is assumed to end when the event arrives before the rotation age is reached (first row), and the landowner loses the forest and has to pay a cost to start the next stand. It is assumed here that the cost needed to reestablish a destroyed stand is equal to the initial cost of starting a forest after harvesting. These two costs need not be equal but the problem then contains slightly more notation.
For a risk neutral landowner, the expected net present value of successive rotations, where (5) holds in each rotation, is:
, which using (5), this becomes,
Evaluating the expectations in the numerator or denominator is not trivial (see Reed 1984 and Amacher et al. 2009, chapter 10) . After this evaluation, we obtain Reed's transformed Faustmann problem, which is to choose the rotation age T to maximize the following expected land value function,
The significance of this new land value and simplicity of the resulting rotation age choice cannot be overemphasized. It is a stochastic version of Faustmann's problem in (1) under assumptions required of that model but relaxing the assumption that the trees are not affected by outside influence. Interestingly, the only modification to land value required is that the Poisson arrival risk parameter is capitalized into the real interest rate, and there is in an increase in the effective cost of restarting a stand after it is destroyed (last RHS term). Since risk of arrival increases the effective discount rate and the cost of restarting a forest, the rotation age is shortened under this type of risk -the marginal cost of delaying harvest is increased more than the marginal benefit of waiting to harvest one more instant.
There are two important extensions common in these models. First, it is not difficult to allow for a non-homogeneous Poisson process where the arrival rates depend on stand age, in which case the probability that the event arrives before the rotation age is ( ) = ( ) and ( = ) = ( ) . This leads to a similar interest rate capitalization where the rotation age depends on assumptions concerning stand age, the usual one (as with fire) being that the arrival rate increases with stand age. The expected land value function in (6) then becomes,
∫ ( ( ) )
.
The optimal rotation age for this expected land value is shorter under the one that maximizes (6) A second common extension has focused on forest management activities and the salvage possibilities should a damaging event arrive before rotation age T. A key assumption in Reed (1984) is that there are no management actions which can affect the damage once fire arrives (he did allow for random damage function though), and thus (5) assumes that the forest is completely destroyed if the event arrives before rotation age is reached. In practice, however, landowners may employ costly management effort that allows some salvage of timber in the first row of (5) where the event arrives before harvesting.
The simplest modification in this case is to write the current rent function Hartman-based versions of the rotation problem under natural risk are another active area of work. Damaging events not only affect harvesting rents but also the flow of amenities, although unlike harvesting rents it is not always clear how amenities are affected, as a stand is opened due to an event such as a wind or ice storm. Englin et al. (2000) is the earliest example of this modification. They assume that the amenity flow function itself equals ( ) as in (3), but arrival of an event ends the rotation early and thus affects the discounted value of amenities captured by a landowner. Using a homogeneous
Poisson arrival assumption, the expected rent function in (5) is modified for amenities in the following manner:
For this rent function, the accumulated present value of amenities depends on whether the arrival of the damaging event occurs before the rotation age or not. The landowner is therefore always better off in the second row of (7). The modification of this rent function again implies that the optimal rotation age shortens relative to the one where risk is not present. However, similar to deterministic models, the expected rotation age is longer than Reed's solution, although compared to deterministic models the rotation age is shorter.
Stochastic market and stand parameters
The introduction of unknown future market parameters to the harvesting decision has been perhaps the most active area of research in forest rotation models since Samuelson's lecture. Market risk is a fundamentally different problem than that of natural risks. Natural risks as they have been modeled imply discrete jumps in forest returns or amenities when they arrive before the rotation age, nearly always making forest landowners worse off even if the stand is only partially destroyed or if protection effort is used. Market parameters such as prices are not as likely to jump rapidly in either positive or negative directions through time. In most cases, any fluctuations are at least damped or centered around a drift defined through equilibrium in stumpage markets. The risk exposure to the landowner also differs, and in fact landowners are not always worse off because of these risks. A low price or high replanting cost could exist at the time of harvesting, making landowner returns lower than expected. However, high prices or low costs could also exist, especially if the volatility or variance in the spread of the parameter distributions is high; in these cases, there could be benefits at the margin from delaying harvesting while waiting for a high price or low cost. Now, a flexible forest harvesting schedule dependent on an endogenous reservation price or endogenous stopping region may be optimal.
The most common way to frame a rotation problem under market risk is as an optimal stopping problem, Each instant of time, if the problem is continuous (it is not in some of the models depending on what is assumed for the stochastic process), a landowner faces a decision to exercise the option to harvest or to wait and continue a rotation (this harvest value is sometimes called the option value). Information about current market parameters is revealed at the start of each period. There are both single rotation and ongoing rotation interpretations of this problem in the literature. But there are two distinct differences in the way these problems are actually solved. In the first and earliest versions, the stopping problem is written as a discrete time stochastic dynamic programming problem. Here, unknown parameters are resolved when the landowner arrives at a given period in the life of a forest and observes a draw of the parameter from a given and known distribution. Thus, the decision becomes a Bellman related problem where the landowner decides whether to continue or to harvest by comparing the returns from harvesting in the current period and possibly a land sale with the expected revenues net of continuation costs in all future periods that arise from delaying harvesting. The Bellman equation for this problem is solved for an endogenous reservation price such that the landowner harvests at the point in time when an observed harvest price draw is greater than the reservation price; this reservation price changes over time as the costs of continuing a rotation change with delay. The second version of this problem is a continuous time version describing continuation and harvesting decisions at each instant in time, but with a continuous stochastic process governing the evolution of market parameters. In this version, the drift and volatility of the process becomes important in the option to harvest versus continuing a rotation at each instant.
The simplest form of the continuous time stochastic rotation problem is written:
Where E is the expectations operator, T is the stopping time (harvest age), ( ) is the harvest payoff value if the option to harvest is exercised, and x is for this case a stochastic stand value that evolves in general terms according to the following diffusion process,
Here, ( ) and ( ) are nonrandom functions and is a continuous time increment of a Weiner process such that: ( ) = 0. Drift is defined by ( ) = ( ) , while volatility is measured by
There is often an initial condition x(0), defined at time zero when the stand is planted at zero cost, assumed here.
The function ( ) includes anything affected by the harvest action and could in principle describe amenities, harvest value, or adjacent forest/landowner influences. This function also serves to distinguish articles in the literature. Some have assumed it equals the forest stock at a given time, and then volatility in this is a form of natural risk since it describes fluctuations in the stock; although these types of fluctuations are different than the jump processes used to describe changes in the forest stock or growth in (5). Also, the single rotation variant has been extended to an ongoing rotations form, but we will stick to the form in (8) due to its simplicity (e.g., see Chang 2005 for details of the stochastic multiple rotations problem). Also, and in many ways much more complicated, there are a few examples of multiple sources of stochasticity in stochastic rotations models. Reed (1993) , for example, proposes a stopping problem where forest stand value and amenities are defined as separate stochastic processes with their own drift and volatility, but where the stochastic processes could be correlated with each other through time.
The optimal stopping time is usually solved for in (8) - (9) by defining stopping boundaries. At the instant stand value breaches one of the boundaries, the landowner harvests and discontinues the rotation -this implicitly defines an endogenous critical level of stand value. As such, we cannot define an exact rotation age but rather an expected rotation age, and drift and volatility affect the boundaries as well as stand value and thus the expected stopping time.
An important assumption in (9) is what is proposed to govern the underlying stochastic process, and it is here that most articles deviate depending on how stand value is modeled and interpreted. The most common form of stochastic stand value is due to price,. Early work assumed prices changed according to simple Brownian motion, = where and are constant and known drift and volatility terms, respectively. Brownian motion suffers from the implication that future prices behaving according to the process can increase without bound. For this reason, two other stochastic processes have been used, including geometric Brownian motion where changes in price are proportional to the current price level, = , so that drift and volatility depend on the value of x, and more recently mean reversion where prices are assumed to return to some long term mean once perturbed,
= ( ) .
With mean reversion, if a value of x is above its mean, then we expect it to decrease, ( ) and for
x below its mean, we have ( ) since ( ) = 0. Given the notion of persistence in the evolvement of prices, mean reversion is consistent with an autoregression assumption in econometrics.
Brownian motion, on the other hand, is consistent with a random walk.
What is assumed for the underlying stochastic process is the subject of much debate. Geometric Brownian motion has been proposed for stochastic timber price and forest stock in Thompson (1992) , , and Clarke and Reed (1989) (2005), and Plantinga (1998) . Interestingly, econometric work attempting to validate one process over another especially for timber price has been inconclusive. Worse, the econometric evidence suggests that the choice of stochastic process may in fact be very specific to a species or market type. For example, there is some evidence of autoregression in prices (Saphores et al. 2002 , Hultkrantz 1995 , but there is other evidence of mean reversion (Gjolberg and Guttormsen 2002) .
Some softwood prices have even inexplicably been found consistent with random walks supporting both versions of Brownian motion (Prestemon 2003) . Still other work suggests that what is assumed for price processes is far too simplistic. Yoshimoto and Shoji (2002) Regardless of what is assumed for the stochastic evolvement of x, and regardless of whether stand value risk is due to stand volume, amenity values, or price, there is a standard procedure that is followed for all stochastic rotation models written as continuous time stopping problems. Although we will not go through all derivations required of these solutions (because Ito calculus is needed and this is beyond the scope of the chapter), the reader is referred to Amacher et al. (2009, Ch. 11) for the methods involved in solving forest harvesting problems like (8), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for more general results and procedures. First we set up the problem in a continuous time Bellman equation analog, and using a stochastic stand value interpretation for the process defining x by assuming it follows an Ito process in (9):
where is an increment of x in the next instant of time, expectations are taken over x, and ( ) is the value to holding the stand and not harvesting, such as known amenities the landowner receives similar to ( ) in (3). The first element of the RHS is the harvest payoff at a stopping value for x, while the second argument is the value of continuation and not harvesting. Following procedures in and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , the Bellman equation can be rewritten by defining it in a small increment of time, ,
which implies that the return from harvesting in the next period depends on additional growth that yields higher amenities B(x) plus the expected value to the landowner from another instant step forward in the stochastic process. The second RHS term ( ) is a function of and is itself a stochastic process. In order to evaluate this term and write it as a function of the drift and volatility of the process x, which is the unknown parameter we are interested in, we must make use of Ito's lemma. Applying Ito's lemma and taking expectations we can write the form of the harvesting equation that many articles focusing on stochastic forest rotation problems have derived:
A value of setting up the problem this way is that we have decomposed changes to the Bellman equation in terms of time (second RHS term), drift (third term), and volatility (fourth term). A closed form solution for this equation requires solving a partial differential equation. Thus, simulations are used to understand how volatility and drift in the process for x affect expected rotation age. To solve these simulations, additional boundary conditions must be imposed that hold at the optimal stopping point.
These conditions are called smooth pasting and value matching and are needed to define the rotation age continuation region and thus expected rotation age. The value matching implies at the optimal stopping point that the value function of the Bellman equation in (10) simply equals the harvesting returns at that instant or from (3), ( ) = ( ). The smooth pasting condition requires, at the instant or stopping, that the marginal change in the value function equals the change in harvesting returns evaluated at the optimal stopping time, ( ) = ( ).
Many different versions of (5) exist in the literature depending on what is assumed for ( ) and x, with many authors omitting ( ) and considering only the effect of stochastic prices on the option value of harvesting (Insley and Rollins 2005) , or modeling price series for harvesting and carbon storage (Chladna 2007) . The basic stochastic rotation problem has also been extended in other directions. In most of this literature, higher price volatility, regardless of the basic stochastic process assumption, leads to longer expected waiting times to harvest unless there are catastrophic risks of continuing a rotation in addition to market risks. Alvarez and Koskela (2002) consider interest rates under mean reversion, finding like under stochastic prices that higher volatility tends to lengthen optimal harvesting thresholds and thus expected rotation ages.
Risk aversion for landowners has rarely been studied, because it greatly complicates characterization of the optimal stopping region. One exception is Motoh (2004) , who finds that risk aversion can have profound effects on stopping regions and expected rotation ages when forest stocks evolve according to Brownian motion and when catastrophic losses explained by a Poisson arrival process are also jointly present. His work and that of others such as Thorsen and Helles (1998) and effectively combine stochastic evolution in market parameters with the types of discrete jump processes that natural events involve. In this work it proves critical whether stand damage allows harvesting after a natural event or not. One area that is still open is how to model amenities in stochastic rotation models. At present, nearly all of the work either lumps the notion of amenities into a general stochastic stand value, modeled as simple or geometric Brownian motion, or assumes amenities themselves evolve according to Brownian motion. Since this is essentially the same as assuming amenities develop over time as random walks, it is not a very satisfying link to the ecology literature where the development of amenities is known to depend on stand structure or adjacent forests.
Arguably more is needed concerning the interaction of risks and importance of natural risk versus market risk in forest harvesting decision models. At present, there has not been enough study to know what types of risks are more important, or how their interaction affects forest management. Such knowledge is critical to policy choice problems where landowner responses must be modeled correctly in order to achieve various goals with policy instruments. Another issue with the literature in stochastic rotation models is the fact that stand value is typically modeled using Brownian type processes, yet we know stand value includes components of price and forest stock changes, and thus assuming the same process governs each of these variables is problematic. It may be that we have seen most of the easy advancements in modeling these types or risks, and now future evolution of research will be much slower even though we still have critical unresolved questions.
There are many other variations of the basic stopping problem, and one in particular that is quite simple and thus has garnered much attention is the reservation price approach. Here, the landowner is assumed to solve a dynamic programming problem where a new market parameter (usually price is assumed) is revealed in each period, and this problem is solved for a reservation price that induces harvesting and thus defines the optimal stopping point. This type of approach is similar to (8), but it has advantages in that it can be formulated as an open loop problem where rotation age is solved at time zero according to expectations of future market parameters, or a closed loop problem where the landowner updates information over time as the stand ages, re-optimizing as market parameters are drawn from an independently and identically distributed random variables in each period.
The first instances of the reservation price stopping problem in forest economics are due to Brazee and Mendelsohn (1988) and Lohmander (1987) . The landowner is assumed to begin a stopping problem written in discrete time. Brazee and Mendelsohn additionally assume that a terminal time is
given in which harvesting must occur if reached, and in periods prior to this terminal time the landowner will harvest when a price is observed that is greater than his reservation price. The reservation price is solved endogenously by considering the decision faced at each time period, either to harvest at the observed price and sell the land at bare land value or to continue the rotation and wait to observe a new price in the next period. Since this is a dynamic programming problem, the principle of optimality holds and it is assumed that all uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of each period.
The reservation price is solved endogenously using a Bellman equation defined by the dynamic programming stopping problem. Using a discrete version of (8) and additionally assuming a land sale occurs at harvest time defined by its expected value ( ), where expectations are taken over the next period price random variable, the Bellman equation is given by:
where ( ) is the value function of the Bellman equation defined at time T, and the reservation price ( ) is a function of time that equates the marginal cost of delaying harvesting as foregone rents in the current period (LHS) with the marginal benefit of waiting one more period to harvest, factoring in the value of land (RHS). The optimal reservation price path through time is solved here simultaneously with land value. The expected harvesting time is solved for by considering when a price is observed above the path, and numerous articles have shown that such behavior outperforms the Faustmann age when prices are not known.
Several extensions of the reservation price model have appeared in the literature. Gong (1998) uses adaptive dynamic programming to solve for a reservation price, showing that the reservation price approach can outperform other rotation age solutions when prices are unknown but autocorrelated through time. Gong et al. (2005) introduces amenities as a function of time in the basic problem of (11) finding that reservation price paths are sensitive to landowner preferences. Gong and Lofgren (2007, 2003) further show that reservation price behavior increases the short term timber supply elasticity with respect to price (relative to a Faustmann approach) as landowners attempt to dampen the impact of price risk.
The collective message from the two main avenues for modeling risk and forest landowner behavior, at least with respect to rotation age, is that greater mean preserving variance or drift neutral volatility can make landowners better off and delay rotation ages, while greater risk of natural events shortens rotation ages unless the landowner can mitigate damages through protection effort, as long as the cost of such protection does not render forest land rents lower than competing use rents. However, the reader should recognize that models such as Reed (1984) suffer from the Faustmann assumptions of constancy of parameters over time. Only under these assumptions does adjusting the risk free interest rate make sense in solving for the optimal rotation age under risk, and it is this adjustment to the opportunity cost of delaying harvesting that shortens rotation ages under greater risk, at least for risk neutral landowners. Interestingly, when this is relaxed in the more dynamic modeling of risk we still find the same basic result concerning shorter rotations with higher risk of loss. But these more dynamic models of drift and volatility for unknown parameters also suffer from simplistic construction of stochastic processes so that the problems are tractable.
The future of forest harvesting models
We began this chapter with Samuelson's reflection and Hartman's contribution and proceeded to review several of the problems and theories used to study the forest rotation and harvesting question since 1976, the year that can be considered a rebirth of modern forest economics theory. Some of these models are age class specific and have postulated amenities that depend collectively on the age classes present in a forest, ( ( ) ( )) , where ( ) could represent the number of trees of age j at time t. 19 However, the typical use of Brownian motion to describe forest amenities in stochastic rotations models is wholly inadequate and would probably be viewed as silly to a biologist.
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The uniformity of assumptions across these problems is surprising given that the modeling of amenities should be dependent on the type of non-timber good under consideration, be it biodiversity, wildlife habitat, aesthetic beauty, or climate maintenance to name a few. In this respect, and at least for forest rotation models, we have not yet successfully merged work on conservation reserve ecology that identifies the links between key habitat and species diversity attributes to forest structure and condition, with the production function type amenity function needed to model the rotation age problem. Further, despite some progress in modeling spatially explicit amenities, the field has not yet successfully modeled the spatial relationships that biologists know exist across habitats and the interconnectedness of ecosystems where forests are but one type. Ultimately, what this means is that we do not yet have the clearest picture of how forest landowners will respond to shifts in markets or policy instruments. The literature on life cycle models has brought us far in understanding how income constraints and consumption preferences might affect forest decisions when preferences and forest harvesting are not separable, but the simple way in which amenities are always introduced into these and other harvesting models implies we still have an imperfect picture of how landowners make decisions involving forests.
From the perspective of a policy maker, the inherent uncertainty in how forest landowners will react to changes in instruments is a problem that is not yet considered. , The only exception to this is found in the recent literature concerning deforestation in tropical countries, where the effects of illegal logging or corruption renderroyalty design a problem of policy choice under uncertainty (e.g., Amacher et
19 Forest age class models have been developed mainly for dynamic life cycle models, but many examples exist in different frameworks (see Mitra and Wan 1985 , Salo and Tahvonen 2003 , Sedjo and Lyon 1990 , and Uusivouri and Kuuluvainen 2005 20 Risk in two period and life cycle models especially in the case of amenities has been more consistently examined than the stochastic rotation literature (see, for an example, Amacher et al. 2009, chapter 9 A second concern, despite the progress that has been made in stochastic rotations problems, is that we have yet to fully understand the complex web of risks and uncertainties faced by forest landowners when deciding to establish and to harvest a forest stand. Indeed, forest rotations models often isolate one risk and study its effect on the optimal rotation age. Only a few articles have considered more than one risk during a rotation despite that ice storms, wind, and fire have visited forests in the same area repeatedly throughout the time periods associated with rotation ages in boreal and temperate forests.
Some exceptions of multiple risk articles include Reed (1993) , Meilby et al. (2001) , and Yin and Newman (1996) . Except for Reed's article, when multiple risks have been considered they are always assumed to be uncorrelated and independent. This is too stylized. Stands could be damaged early in their history by ice or wind storms, and this makes them more susceptible to fire damage given the higher fuel loading present over a longer life of the stand. Forest health declines from pest attacks also increase either fuel loadings and make trees susceptible to wind damage. Conversely, wind damage stresses surviving trees making them susceptible to beetles that already are present in the stand. As climate change makes the variability and arrival of multiple events higher, the likelihood of both correlated arrival of events or correlated damage functions and salvage possibilities across more than one event will become increasingly important to forest establishment and management.
The problem of multiple sources of risk and correlation of events during the life of a forest is particularly relevant to the production of amenities and their effects on forest management decisions.
There are certainly cases where amenity production is correlated with the arrival or non-arrival of natural events in the life of a stand. Another reality is that the evolution of amenities on one landowner's property could also depend on adjacent landowner decisions and resulting forest condition that are unknown to the focal landowner throughout the rotation. We have very little understanding of amenity fluctuations and their impact on forest management decisions under these cases. Until we revise our modeling of the flow of amenities and the risks that forest landowners face to better reflect ecological processes and market shifts, we will continue to find the same simple conclusions regarding risk, amenities, and rotation ages that have existed since the early 1980s.
Perhaps the most fundamental omission in forest harvesting models is the problem of pure uncertainty, that is, cases where forest landowners do not even know the distribution describing states of nature for market parameters, natural events, or their forest stocks. We could easily imagine that such a case would arise where in situ amenities for a single landowner depend on landowner preferences, ecological processes, and possibly adjacent forest parcels in unknown ways. The macroeconomics literature has long dealt with this problem as fiscal policy must be chosen under very uncertain future conditions. Should these approaches be adapted to study forest management decisions, a precautionary type of behavior would likely be discovered which, in the face of uncertainty, might lead to different conclusions concerning when trees are harvested.
To illustrate how stochastic rotations models could be extended to the pure uncertainty case and precautionary decision making, suppose we take an infinite time horizon problem where harvesting flows can happen annually (there is a stopping problem equivalent to this but the flow case is simpler although less realistic to describe periodic harvesting). Suppose given our earlier discussion that forest growth is stochastic. There are two ways to describe this over time, one is simply to assume that there are perturbations to forest growth, ( ) = [ ( ( )) ( )] ( ), where ( ) is the forest stock, Suppose, however, that the forest landowner has doubts about the process itself governing stochasticity. This is equivalent to the landowner having doubts about the model specification at its most fundamental level. In this case we can modify the problem of forest harvesting to one where we allow for model misspecification formalized through a family of perturbations to the stochastic process, such that measure G is distorted to another measure, Q, when miss-specified, and such that probability space G cannot be distinguished from Q without infinite data. This implies we can write the stochastic process using: ( ) = ̃( ) ∫ ( ) where ̃( ) is mean zero Brownian motion, and ( ) is measurable drift distortion (= 0 under measure G). Under measure G the landowner is not concerned that the benchmark problem is miss-specified. However, under miss-specification, stochastic growth is represented with a new perturbed equation of motion,
Following Hansen et al. (2001) and Hansen and Sargent (2002) , bounds need to be placed on the seriousness of model miss-specification, and thus an 'entropy' is defined that formalizes the distance between measure G and measure Q. The following constraint limits this entropy so that the measures are not too dissimilar so as to be distinguishable,
where represents an exogenous parameter indicating the maximum error that the landowner will accept in not knowing forest stock evolution. We also need measure Q to have finite entropy, so that:
Using (12) - (14), we can now propose a robust control interpretation for the forest harvesting problem where the landowner cares about both forest harvest rents and amenities, but has doubts about the distribution governing forest growth stochasticity, implying the forest harvesting problem is possibly 22 Stochastic amenities would then give ( ) = ̃( ) ( ) under a miss-specification of their measure. miss-specified. 23 This type of problem becomes a harvesting decision in which the landowner plays a game against nature, where nature moves first and chooses the extent of entropy, and then the landowner seeks a harvesting strategy that does best against the worst case scenario that nature can choose. 24 The model with the possibility of miss-specification is written,
In this max-min problem, amenities ( ( )) are a function of the forest stock, and is the multiplier of entropy constraint: ( ) . It turns out also that is a measure of decision maker uncertainty aversion, or how averse to model miss-specification in forest growth the landowner is with respect to his harvesting decision. It represents the tolerable error the landowner is willing to accept, so that from (13), implies and therefore we solve the landowner's problem after nature's move for a given .
The next step is to define a Bellman-Isaacs equation using Ito's lemma and then investigate how the path of harvesting and the state of amenities produced from the forest depend on uncertainty aversion.
Since uncertainty aversion is exogenous to the decision maker, the Bellman equation is written for a given . The resulting robust harvesting decision would represent a precautionary solution given that the landowner plans forest management to do the best in the worst case scenario for forest stock (i.e., the worst case scenario of model miss-specification) and therefore resulting amenity production. The worst case nature scenario would essentially imply a lower forest stock and lower amenity production. Thus it is possible that the precautionary solution will involve a harvesting path that leads to over production of amenities or the timber stock. This solution idea fundamentally changes what we know about the harvest decision. It is even possible in a stopping model that the precautionary solution is different than what has been characterized in both reservation price and stochastic rotation versions.
